by Ron Ben-Yishai
Part 1 of analysis:
No dramatic changes are expected in our security situation next year. A war will not break out, and a major military confrontation will likely not take place. For the time being, all the main players in the region that may ignite a major flare-up have a strong interest in maintaining restraint and avoiding confrontation.
Yet this doesn’t mean there is no cause for concern. Fuel vapors are still in the air, as well as enough sparks that may ignite them. The constant tensions in the Lebanon and Gaza theaters may cause occasional flare-ups, despite the desire on both sides to avoid them. This was the case this past year, and this will likely be the case in the coming year…
Part 2 of analysis:
In addition to the military buildup, preparations, and intelligence-gathering ahead of a defensive and offensive effort in the face of the Iranian threat, the IDF will focus on boosting its readiness and capabilities vis-à-vis the missile and rocket threat in closer theaters.
On the intelligence front, three issues will be emphasized: Identifying targets in Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza for the benefit of the Air Force, as well as ground and naval forces; monitoring the military buildup of Hezbollah, Hamas, and Syria – to ensure they are not receiving and deploying “balance-breaking” weapon systems such as advanced anti-aircraft missiles, surface-to-surface missiles, and advanced rockets (made by Russia or Iran,) and so on; and identifying Hezbollah and Hamas tunnels, arms depots, and fortifications in the heart of civilian areas (information that will also be used in the diplomatic-PR campaign.)